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Ashton, Bekins, and Necessity: Why Chapter
9 Is Constitutional, But Not the Only Way
for Municipalities to Adjust Their Debts
Aaron Michael Dmiszewicki *
The 1930s saw the nation in crisis, steeped in the worst of the
Great Depression. In 1936, over 2,000 municipalities, counties,
and other governmental units, in 41 of the 48 states, were known
to be in default. In response to this crisis, Congress amended the
Bankruptcy Act in 1934 and passed the first municipal
bankruptcy statute. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court struck
it down. Undeterred, Congress passed another municipal
bankruptcy statute in 1937, which was almost identical to the
previously invalidated law. In 1938, the Supreme Court, now
stocked with Roosevelt-appointed New Deal sympathizers,
upheld the law.
However, the latter case, while perhaps correctly decided, was
woefully lacking in analysis. Since that time, no court has
engaged in the appropriate legwork to make a case for both the
need and constitutionality of a municipal bankruptcy statute.
This paper aims to connect the dots between Chapter 9, the
Contract Clause, and the Tenth Amendment to establish that,
while Chapter 9 is undoubtedly constitutional, the Supreme
Court overstated its necessity, and its necessity remains
overstated today.
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PART I. INTRODUCTION
Although municipal bankruptcy has existed since the 1930s, never
did it get so much attention as when the City of Detroit filed the largest
municipal bankruptcy in history in the middle of 2013. The filing caused
an uproar, as thousands of state pensioners fought to prevent the City
from modifying their retirement benefits in the bankruptcy. 1 Various
creditors and citizens filed roughly twelve objections, each with various
sub-objections, to the Detroit filing, of which one was to the very
constitutionality of Chapter 9. 2 On December 5, 2013, Bankruptcy Judge
Steven Rhodes issued a ruling on each of those objections, holding that
Chapter 9 did not violate the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy
Clause, the Contract Clause, or the Tenth Amendment. 3
This paper, however, focuses not on the Detroit bankruptcy in and of
itself, but rather addresses the concern that states cannot adjust their
debts outside of the bankruptcy regime, as well as the specific objection
1

Matt Helms, Nancy Kaffer & Stephen Henderson, Detroit Files for Chapter 9
Bankruptcy Amid Staggering Debts, Detroit Free Press, July 19, 2013, at A1; see also
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (“The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and
retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual
obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.”).
2
See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (analyzing and
ruling on each of the objections).
3
Id. at 136–54.

2015]

ASHTON, BEKINS, AND NECESSITY

61

that Chapter 9 violates the Tenth Amendment. Indeed, at this point, a
discussion of the objections themselves is largely moot, as the Detroit
bankruptcy was confirmed in late 2014. 4 In his opinion overruling the
objections, Judge Rhodes hung his hat 5 on a Supreme Court case from
1938, in which the Supreme Court, recognizing the necessity of a
municipal bankruptcy option during the height of the Great Depression,
found that municipal bankruptcy was constitutional, only two years after
striking down a similar law. 6 Bekins adopted the logic, common in the
bankruptcy context, that bankruptcy—and only bankruptcy—can fix
these problems, so “get out of the way” and “let us do our job.” 7 Bekins
further suggested that, because the State of California consented to the
bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment had been effectively waived, and
there was no federalism issue. 8
Bekins, however, focused on the wrong issue. Even prior to the
decision in Bekins, the Contract Clause—the traditional impediment to
state insolvency solutions—had been under fire to the point where a state
remedy really was a possibility. 9 Today, however, the Contract Clause
has been all but written out of the Constitution. 10 Accordingly, were
municipal bankruptcy to go before the Supreme Court for the first time
today, the Court would likely have to rest its decision on something other
than the states’ inability to act otherwise. This is largely because the
modern trend in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is to focus on whether
or not the federal government is coercing states to adopt a federal
scheme. Plainly, by both the language of Chapter 9 and the presence of

4

See Oral Opinion on the Record, In re City of Detroit, No. 13–53846 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/news/oral-opinionrecord-re-city-detroit-bankruptcy-judge-steven-rhodes-november-7-2014.
5
In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 141–44.
6
Compare United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938) (finding the new municipal
bankruptcy law, as enacted in 1937, constitutional), with Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water
Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (finding the old municipal bankruptcy
law, as enacted in 1934, unconstitutional).
7
Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54 (“We see no ground for the conclusion that the Federal
Constitution, in the interest of state sovereignty, has reduced both sovereigns to
helplessness in such a case.”); see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy:
Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 660
(2008) (“We need to get bankruptcy work done somewhere, and the system we have—for
all its conceptual anomalies—is as good as any.”).
8
Bekins, 304 U.S. at 47–48; contra Ashton, 298 U.S. at 531 (“Neither consent nor
submission by the states can enlarge the powers of Congress; none can exist except those
which are granted.”).
9
See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) [hereinafter
Blaisdell IV].
10
See infra Part III.
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real alternatives for the states, that is not the case in the context of
municipal bankruptcy. 11
In Part II of this paper, I will attempt to set Ashton and Bekins in
their historical context in order to explore how we got to the conclusion
that state consent is sufficient to meet any Tenth Amendment challenges.
In Part III, I will explore the purported necessity of a municipal
bankruptcy statute by exploring the relationship between the Bankruptcy
Clause and the Contracts Clause, and show that municipal bankruptcy
was not a necessary remedy at the time either Ashton or Bekins were
decided, and remains unneeded. In Part IV, I will address the Tenth
Amendment concern that still exists in Chapter 9, notwithstanding the
lack of necessity for such a law. Finally, in Part V, I will conclude.

PART II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ASHTON AND BEKINS
A. The First Municipal Bankruptcy Statute
To truly consider the requirements and constitutionality of Chapter 9,
we must go back to the last great economic downturn in American
history, the Great Depression. Prior to 1934, there was no municipal
bankruptcy statute, 12 leaving thousands of municipal units floundering
during the height of financial catastrophe as the tax base crumbled
beneath them. 13 Congress, under immense pressure to act, 14 passed the
first municipal bankruptcy statute in 1934, which I shall call the 1934
Act. 15 In relevant part, it provided:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to
limit or impair the power of any State to control, by
legislation or otherwise, any political subdivision thereof
in the exercise of its political or governmental powers,
11
Georgia, for example, specifically disallows municipal units from filing for
bankruptcy. How, then, could Chapter 9 be coercive? See GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5
(2013).
12
Michael W. McConnell & Randall C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 427 (1993).
13
Ashton, 298 U.S. at 533–34 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (noting that 2,019
municipalities, counties, and other governmental units, in 41 of the 48 states, were known
to be in default).
14
See S. REP. NO. 73-407, at 1–2 (1934) (recognizing that only Congress could act, as
the Contracts Clause bars the states from impairing the obligation of contracts).
15
Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, 48 Stat. 798 (codified as 11 U.S.C.
§ 301–03) (1934) (amending the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to include “Provisions for the
Emergency Temporary Aid of Insolvent Public Debtors and to Preserve the Assets
Thereof and for Other Related Purposes”).

2015]

ASHTON, BEKINS, AND NECESSITY

63

including expenditures therefor, and including the power
to require the approval by any governmental agency of
the State of the filing of any petition hereunder and of
any plan of readjustment, and whenever there shall exist
or shall hereafter be created under the law of any State
any agency of such State authorized to exercise
supervision or control over the fiscal affairs of all or any
political subdivisions thereof, and whenever such agency
has assumed such supervision or control over any
political subdivision, then no petition of such political
subdivision may be received hereunder unless
accompanied by the written approval of such agency,
and no plan of readjustment shall be put into temporary
effect or finally confirmed without the written approval
of such agency of such plans. 16 (emphasis added)
In short, Congress, cognizant of the potential Tenth Amendment
pitfalls of a municipal bankruptcy statute,17 explicitly provided in the
1934 Act that the states retained the power to determine whether a
municipality was eligible to file for bankruptcy. 18

B. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1
The 1934 Act received its first test on July 17, 1934, when a water
district in Cameron County, Texas, unable to meet its bond obligations,
presented a petition to the United States District Court.19 After the
District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the Fifth Circuit
reversed and remanded, the dissenting bondholders filed a petition for
certiorari, which was subsequently granted.20
Before discussing exactly what the Supreme Court did, it is
important to note the makeup of the Court in 1936. The Hughes Court of
the 1930s and early 1940s was something of a watershed moment in the
history of the Court, as slowly but surely President Roosevelt replaced
the four conservatives on the Court—Justices Butler, McReynolds,
16

11 U.S.C. § 301(k) (1934), invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water
Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
17
S. REP. NO. 73-407, at 2.
18
See Nicholas B. Malito, Municipal Bankruptcy: An Overview of Chapter 9 and a
Critique of the “Specifically Authorized” and “Insolvent” Eligibility Requirements of 11
U.S.C.A. § 109(c), 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 517, 520 (2008).
19
In re Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 9 F. Supp. 103, 103 (S.D.
Tex. 1934).
20
Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 524
(1936).
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Sutherland, and van Devanter (collectively known as the “Four
Horsemen”)—with pro-New Deal Justices Black and Reed. 21 Bitterly
opposed to almost all New Deal legislation, the Four Horsemen had
fought tooth and nail to maintain a strict line between the powers of the
states and the federal government and to limit the federal government’s
power to regulate commerce. 22
In a 5–4 decision written by Justice McReynolds and joined by
Justices Butler, Sutherland, van Devanter, and Roberts, the majority cited
three reasons for finding the municipal bankruptcy statute
unconstitutional.23 First, the Court held that because the water
improvement district was a political subdivision of the state chartered for
local benefit, its fiscal affairs were purely local and not subject to
oversight by the federal government. 24 If the obligations of the states
were so subject to federal intrusion, then state sovereignty would not
really exist. 25 Secondly, the Court, invoking the Contract Clause, 26 found
that a state entity invoking the bankruptcy clause was an impermissible
means of sidestepping the constitutional prohibition of states impairing
contracts. 27 Finally, the Court held that Congress did not possess the
ability to increase its own power vis-à-vis the states, even with the states’
consent. 28 Ashton has been criticized as “[motivated more by] judicial
ideology than sound legal reasoning”29 and “unnecessary and
misguided” 30 by modern scholars; however, as I will soon point out,
Bekins, the case that overruled Ashton, fails to engage in any meaningful
constitutional analysis at all.

C. The Second Municipal Bankruptcy Statute
Undeterred by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ashton, and still
recognizing a dire need for municipal bankruptcy, and reiterating the
argument that “relief must come from Congress, if at all,” 31 Congress
21

See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213–36 (1995) (describing the
“Constitutional Revolution of 1937”).
22
See id. at 132–33.
23
Ashton, 298 U.S. at 527–28, 531.
24
Id. at 527–28.
25
Id. at 531 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 430 (1819)).
26
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.”).
27
See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 531.
28
Id.
29
Malito, supra note 18, at 521.
30
McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 452.
31
H.R. REP. NO. 75-517, at 3 (1937). The Senate adopted the House Report verbatim
in voting for passage. S. REP. NO. 75-911, at 1 (1937).
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went back to the drawing board and enacted the second municipal
bankruptcy statute in 1937 (which I shall call the 1937 Act).32 In relevant
part, the 1937 Act provided:
State powers unaffected. Nothing contained in this
chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the power of
any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any
municipality or any political subdivision of or in such
State in the exercise of its political or governmental
powers, including expenditures therefor.33
Despite considerably less sweeping language than the heretoforeinvalidated 1934 Act (note that the 1937 Act has no requirement that the
state consents to a municipality’s petition), Congress strongly believed
that the 1934 Act passed constitutional muster. 34 However, Congress
changed very little structurally in amending the statute; their argument
essentially was that the Court in Ashton was wrong, not that the
amendments addressed the Court’s concerns. 35

D. United States v. Bekins
Unsurprisingly, given the ongoing solvency concerns in
municipalities nationwide, the Supreme Court was soon given an
opportunity to rule on the 1937 Act. 36 In the two years since Ashton,
however, the Court’s makeup had changed substantially. Justices
Sutherland and van Devanter, two of the “Four Horsemen”, retired. 37
President Roosevelt replaced them with Hugo Black and Stanley Reed,
both of whom were supporters of the New Deal and much more flexible
in their understanding of dual sovereignty. 38 Additionally, Justice
Roberts, fresh off his “switch in time that saved nine” in West Coast

32

Act of August 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, 50 Stat. 653 (subsequently codified at
11 U.S.C. §§ 401–04).
33
11 U.S.C. § 403(i) (Supp. 1939).
34
H.R. REP. NO. 75-517, at 2 (1937) (“The bill here recommended for passage
expressly avoids any restriction on the powers of the States or their arms of government
in the exercise of their sovereign rights and duties. No interference with the fiscal or
governmental affairs of a political subdivision is permitted. The taxing agency itself is the
only instrumentality which can seek the benefits of the proposed legislation. No
involuntary proceedings are allowable, and no control or jurisdiction over that property
and those revenues of the petitioning agency necessary for essential governmental
services is conferred by the bill.”).
35
Id. at 2–3.
36
See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
37
See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 21, at 155–56, 220.
38
See id. at 211–12, 226.
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Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 39 seemed to have become more amendable to the
New Deal. In a 6–2 opinion, 40 in another case involving an insolvent
water district strangely enough, the Supreme Court upheld the 1937
Act. 41 However, in light of the holding in Ashton, the Court’s
justification for changing its mind was startlingly weak, and it is just as
likely that the Court’s change of heart was based on its composition than
any legal argument. 42
The Court justified its decision based on three distinctions between
the 1937 Act and the 1934 Act.43 First, the 1937 Act was limited to
voluntary proceedings, as the 1937 Act makes it much more clear that
only a taxing entity can be a petitioner.44 Secondly, the 1937 Act was,
according to the Court, drawn so as not to infringe upon state
sovereignty. 45 Finally, the Court found no grounds for the conclusion
that state sovereignty was so unshakeable that both the states and
Congress would be reduced to helplessness in cases of municipal
insolvency. 46
The Court’s second justification, that because California consented
to the bankruptcy the Tenth Amendment concerns were assuaged, lacks
any constitutional analysis. The Court began with the shocking
declaration that, “It is unnecessary to consider the question whether
Chapter 10 would be valid as applied to the irrigation district in the
absence of the consent of the State which created it, for the State has
given its consent.” 47 This argument completely ignores the concern
presented in Ashton, that “[n]either consent nor submission by the states
39

300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54 (Justice Cardozo, who authored the dissent in Ashton,
strangely did not participate).
41
Id. at 51.
42
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH[3] (16th ed., 2013); see also David Fellman,
Ten Years of the Supreme Court: 1937–1947, I. Federalism, 41 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1142,
1148 n.28 (1947) (“Since the [1934 Act and the 1937 Act] were practically identical, a
curious feature of the Bekins case was that instead of overruling the earlier decision, the
Court made a feeble effort at distinguishing them.”).
43
The bondholders also posited an argument that Chapter X, as it was then called,
violated the Fifth Amendment. The Court dismissed this argument, citing In re Reiman,
20 F. Cas. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (finding composition in bankruptcy constitutional).
44
Bekins, 304 U.S. at 47; see also 11 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. 1939) (defining a petitioner
as “any taxing agency or instrumentality referred to in section 401 of this chapter”), and
§ 403 (“Any petitioner may file a petition hereunder . . .”) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, even Ashton seemed to suggest that the 1934 Act only allowed for
voluntary petitions. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S.
513, 530 (1936) (“If voluntary proceedings may be permitted, so may involuntary ones,
subject, of course, to any inhibition of the Eleventh Amendment.”).
45
Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51.
46
Id. at 54.
47
Id. at 47.
40
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can enlarge the powers of Congress; none can exist except those which
are granted.” 48 What makes this even more perplexing is that, unlike the
unconstitutional 1934 Act, the 1937 Act does not explicitly require state
authorization. 49 The Court “attach[ed] no importance to this omission,”
without any meaningful explanation.50 This is not to say that the Court in
Ashton was correct, but neither the Court in Bekins nor any subsequent
court has done the appropriate constitutional legwork to explain how
consent satisfies the Tenth Amendment in the bankruptcy context.
Where the majority in Bekins really seems to ground its ruling,
however, is in Congress’s assertion that a municipal bankruptcy statute
was truly needed, and that absent congressional action, the states would
be powerless to act. 51 Unfortunately, mere exigency is not—and arguably
should not be—enough to overcome the constitutional framework. 52
Only a year prior to Bekins, Justice Sutherland, in arguing that the states
did not have the authority to enact minimum wage laws, wrote, “If the
Constitution, intelligently and reasonably construed in the light of these
principles, stands in the way of desirable legislation, the blame must rest
upon that instrument, and not upon the court for enforcing it according to
its terms.” 53 Ultimately, whether or not the Constitution allows for
exigencies such as this is a matter of ideology; however, even still, the
Bekins majority failed to engage in the constitutional legwork. Instead,
the Court was “of the opinion that the [House Committee on the
Judiciary]’s points are well taken and that chapter 10 is a valid
enactment.” 54 Rather than challenging or engaging with the Committee’s
argument—which, as I already discussed, was fairly weak—the Court
simply accepts that the 1937 Act fixes all of the problems of the 1934
Act. 55

PART III. THE NECESSITY OF A MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY STATUTE
As Congress noted in passing both the 1934 Act and the 1937 Act,
the general understanding of the Contract Clause at the time was that
states were held essentially powerless in adjusting municipal debt,
48

Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 531
(1936).
49
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 303(k) (1934), with 11 U.S.C. § 403(i) (Supp. 1939).
50
Bekins, 304 U.S. at 49.
51
Id. at 51.
52
Though, as I shall explain in Part III infra the Contract Clause had already been
subject to the same result, thereby obviating the need for municipal bankruptcy at all.
53
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 404 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
54
Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51.
55
Id. at 51–53.
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leaving only Congress able to act, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause. 56
Although that may have been true at the time—and it is not entirely clear
that it was—it is almost certainly no longer true. Roughly three-quarters
of a century of jurisprudence has largely eroded the original basis for
passing municipal bankruptcy statutes and for deeming them
constitutional by necessity. In short, Chapter 9 is constitutional today
because the Court said so in Bekins. However, the reasoning behind it—
that Congressional action was necessary because the Contract Clause
precluded the states from acting—was untrue then and is certainly untrue
now. Were a court to see municipal bankruptcy today, without precedent,
it is unlikely that it would declare it as violating the Tenth Amendment,
as Chapter 9 lacks any meaningfully coercive elements. Rather, the
“necessity” argument would focus not on federalism concerns but
whether the exigency is sufficient to avoid the Contract Clause
altogether.

A. Was Municipal Bankruptcy Necessary in 1934?
The Contract Clause, on its face, would seem to preclude states from
passing any legislation that would impair the obligations of contracts.57
Although there was very little discussion of the Contract Clause during
the Constitutional Convention, there is some evidence that the Framers
intended a broad reading of the clause, applying it to both private and
public contracts. 58 Prior to passing the 1934 Act, municipalities that were
in danger of not being able to service their bond obligations could remain
solvent essentially only by raising their taxes, a move that in the financial
ruin of the 1930s would have been as politically unpopular as it would be
ineffective. 59 Although there was likewise very little discussion of the
Bankruptcy Clause during the drafting of the constitution,60 the Framers
56

See S. REP. NO. 73-407, at 1–2 (1934); H.R. REP. NO. 75-517, at 3 (1937); see also
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have the Power . . . To establish . . .
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . .”).
57
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts.”).
58
JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 45–46 (2007).
59
See Jeff B. Fordham, Methods of Enforcing Satisfaction of Obligations of Public
Corporations, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 28, 44–53 (1933) (discussing the existence of and
requirements for a writ of mandamus to compel taxation); Ashton v. Cameron Cnty.
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 533–34 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting)
(“In such circumstances the only remedy was a mandamus whereby the debtor was
commanded to tax and tax again. The command was mere futility when tax values were
exhausted.”) (citations omitted).
60
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 267 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet
Classic 2003) (providing the sole mention of bankruptcy in the Federalist Papers).
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probably would have understood it broadly to encompass both private
and public bankruptcies. 61 It was with that backdrop that Congress
passed the 1934 Act.
However, it is not readily apparent that, even by the time of the
passage of the 1934 Act, the states were powerless to act. About four
months prior, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Home Building
& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 62 in which the Court held that “[t]he economic
interests of the state may justify the exercise of its continuing and
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with
contracts.” 63 At issue in Blaisdell was the wonderfully alliterative
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, which provided that, during the
housing emergency brought on by the Great Depression, foreclosures and
execution sales could be postponed via judicial proceedings. 64 The
economic situation in Minnesota was startlingly bleak, as farmers were
forced to cope with the lowest agricultural prices in a generation.65
Governor Floyd B. Olson, cognizant of other mortgage moratoria in the
neighboring states of South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Nebraska, and under
enormous public pressure, directed the state sheriffs to refrain from
continuing any foreclosure action until further order, invoking the state’s
traditional “police power” to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens. 66 The order was so popular that the Minnesota legislature
codified it less than a month later.67
The Home Building and Loan Association foreclosed on the
Blaisdells’ home on May 2, 1932. 68 Under Minnesota law at the time, the
couple had one year to redeem the property, at a cost of about $3,700,
exclusive of taxes and interest. 69 Unable to redeem the property in time,
61
See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 370 (2006) (“The power granted to
Congress by that Clause is a unitary concept rather than an amalgam of discrete
segments.”).
62
Blaisdell IV, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
63
Id. at 437.
64
Id. at 416; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 9633-1 to -21 (1934 Supp.).
65
JOHN A. FLITER & DEREK S. HOFF, FIGHTING FORECLOSURE: THE BLAISDELL CASE,
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE, AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 68 (2012).
66
Id. at 70.
67
Id. at 71.
68
Id. at 89.
69
Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 249 N.W. 334, 334–35 (Minn. 1933)
[hereinafter Blaisdell II]. As an aside, such redemption laws are ancient, dating back at
least to biblical times. See Leviticus 25:29–30 (JPS Tanakh) (“And if a man sell a
dwelling-house in a walled city, then he may redeem it within a whole year after it is
sold; for a full year shall he have the right of redemption. And if it be not redeemed
within the space of a full year, then the house that is in the walled city shall be made sure
in perpetuity to him that bought it, throughout his generations; it shall not go out in the
jubilee.”).
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the Blaisdells found themselves extremely lucky when Governor Olson
signed the Mortgage Moratorium Law mere weeks before the sale was to
be finalized. 70 The Blaisdells filed suit under the Mortgage Moratorium
Law seeking to extend their redemption period, but the trial judge
immediately dismissed the case, reasoning that the law violated the
Contract Clause and was an improper use of state police power because it
served only private interests. 71
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that the law
did indeed impair the obligation of contracts.72 However, the majority
disagreed with the trial judge, saying that, although normally it does not
matter in whom the title to lands rest, the sheer number of families in
danger of losing their homes was indeed a public concern, bringing it
within the police power of the state to regulate. 73 Additionally, the
majority noted the narrow breadth of the law, which limited foreclosure
by advertisement not by action, limited the time, and required a hearing
before the redemption period could be extended. 74 In other words, the
Minnesota Supreme Court took a very narrow view of what it means to
impair a contract and concluded that the moratorium did not meet that
standard. 75 After the Blaisdells won in the state trial court on remand, the
Association appealed again and lost in the Minnesota Supreme Court, for
the reasons they stated in the first appeal. 76
After having lost three times in the Minnesota courts, the Association
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed the
Minnesota Supreme Court by a 5–4 vote. 77 In a bizarre twist, after
warning that “[e]mergency does not create power,”78 the Court
sanctioned just the opposite and concluded that the Contract Clause was
meant to “inspire a general prudence and industry,” not to prevent the
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FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 90.
Id. at 91–92; see also Blaisdell II, 249 N.W. at 335.
72
Blaisdell II, 249 N.W. at 335.
73
Id. at 337; cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (holding
approximately a decade later that an aggregate effect on the price of wheat allowed
Congress to regulate purely intrastate wheat growth under the Commerce Clause).
74
Blaisdell II, 249 N.W. at 338.
75
Id. at 336, 338 (concluding that where the impairment is only temporary and
narrowly tailored, the states’ general police power trumps the Contract Clause.).
76
Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 249 N.W. 893, 894 (Minn. 1933)
[hereinafter Blaisdell III] (per curiam) .
77
Blaisdell IV, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934).
78
Id. at 425. This mirrors language from the Minnesota Supreme Court, which read,
“Although emergency cannot become the source of power, and although the Constitution
cannot be suspended in any complication of peace or war, an emergency may afford a
reason for putting forth a latent governmental power already enjoyed but not previously
exercised.” Blaisdell II, 249 N.W. at 336.
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state legislature from acting in a declared emergency. 79 Although
Blaisdell did not completely neuter the Contract Clause, it severely
limited its force, as was demonstrated in subsequent cases.80
Interestingly, as a matter of vote counting, the majority in Blaisdell
was comprised of Justices Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo, and
Roberts, with the Four Horsemen dissenting. 81 Justice Sutherland, in
blistering dissent, reasoned that “[The Contract Clause] was framed and
adopted with the specific and studied purpose of preventing legislation
designed to relieve debtors especially in time of financial distress.” 82
Justice Roberts, the obvious swing vote in Blaisdell, then perplexingly
joined the majority in Ashton, which posited that municipal bankruptcy
was simply a way to skirt the Contract Clause, by delegating the power
to Congress, and otherwise adhered to the philosophy that emergency
can enlarge neither enumerated powers nor explicit prohibitions.83 We
may never know what caused this switch, as Roberts had his personal
papers burned after his death.84 It does, however, continue to affect the
credibility of the Court with respect to all of these decisions.
What all of this serves to do is undermine the reasoning both of the
dissent in Ashton and the majority in Bekins. The dissent in Ashton
argued that, “[t]he Constitution prohibits the states from passing any law
that will impair the obligation of existing contracts . . . .Relief must come
from Congress if it is to come from any one.” 85 The majority in Bekins
opined that “[t]here is no hope for relief through statutes enacted by the
States, because the Constitution forbids the passing of State laws
impairing the obligations of existing contracts. Therefore, relief must
come from Congress, if at all.” 86 It is clear that neither of those
statements were true. Like the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law,
the 1934 Act was time-limited. 87 Like the Minnesota law, the 1934 Act
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Blaisdell IV, 290 U.S. at 427–28 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison)).
See FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 157; see also infra Parts III.C–D.
81
See Blaisdell IV, 290 U.S. at 398, 448.
82
Id. at 453-54 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); cf. Ashton v. Cameron
Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) (“The Constitution was
careful to provide that ‘no State shall pass any Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.’ This she may not do under the form of a bankruptcy act or otherwise.”)
(citations omitted).
83
See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530–31.
84
FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 165–66 (positing Roosevelt’s court packing plan,
Roosevelt’s landslide reelection in 1936, as well as a simple legal technicality).
85
Ashton, 298 U.S. at 534. (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
86
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938).
87
See 11 U.S.C. § 302 (1934) (“Until the expiration of two years from May 24,
1934 . . . courts of bankruptcy shall exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings for the
relief of debtors, as provided in this chapter of this title.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 963380
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was tailored for a very specific emergency in the depths of the Great
Depression. 88 And yet Blaisdell was cited in neither Ashton nor Bekins,
in neither majority nor dissent. In reality, there was at least some
evidence that the states could act in a way that impaired contracts, as
long as they did not impair them beyond what was necessary to counter
the emergency. 89 Although the 1934 Act may still have violated the
Tenth Amendment, the alarmism of Justice Cardozo and the majority in
Bekins was wholly unfounded.

B. Had the Contract Clause Been Effectively Written Out of the
Constitution by 1936?
States have always been able to create their own bankruptcy statutes,
with the caveat that such statutes can only govern contracts that do not
yet exist and cannot be retroactively applied.90 But for the Contract
Clause, municipal bankruptcy would be largely unnecessary, as states
would clearly be free to adjust their municipalities’ debts on their own.91
The Contract Clause took a big hit when the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the ruling of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Blaisdell
IV, a ruling that should have been a strong factor in deciding Ashton and
Bekins. Although Blaisdell was not even mentioned in either Ashton or
Bekins, it is still widely believed that the Contract Clause precludes states
from enacting their own bankruptcy statutes. 92 In fact, the Contract
Clause is all but dead, leaving modern legal justification for the necessity
of municipal bankruptcy without a leg to stand on.93
In the cases immediately following Blaisdell, the Court seemed
determined to limit its applicability. In fact, less than six months after
deciding Blaisdell, the Court struck down an Arkansas statute that
20 (1934 Supp.) (“This Act shall remain in effect only during the continuance of the
emergency and in no event beyond May 1, 1935.”).
88
See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1934) (“There is hereby found, determined, and declared to
exist a national emergency caused by increasing financial difficulties of many local
governmental unities, which renders imperative the further exercise of the bankruptcy
powers of the Congress of the United States.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 9633-2 (1934
Supp.) (“In view of the situation hereinbefore set forth, the Legislature of the State of
Minnesota hereby declares that a public economic emergency does exist in the State of
Minnesota.”).
89
See Blaisdell IV, 290 U.S. at 431 (“The obligations of a contract are impaired by a
law which renders them invalid, or releases or extinguishes them.”) (citations omitted).
90
See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197–200 (1819).
91
See Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51.
92
See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 143–44 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013)
(finding that, save one case ostensibly limited to its facts, courts have always found that
the Contract Clause prohibits municipal bankruptcy legislation).
93
See FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 174.
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exempted life insurance proceeds from creditors’ garnishment.94
Although the majority based its decision on the fact that, unlike
Blaisdell, the Arkansas statute lacked the “temporary and conditional
relief,” 95 the concurrence, written by Justice Sutherland and signed by
the other three Horsemen, used Thomas as an opportunity to fight back
against Blaisdell, claiming
[w]e are unable to agree with the view set forth in the
opinion that the differences between the Arkansas statute
and the Minnesota mortgage moratorium law . . . are
substantial. . . . We were unable then, as we are now, to
concur in the view that an emergency can ever justify . . .
a nullification of the constitutional restriction upon state
upon state power in respect of the impairment of
contractual obligations. 96
In 1935, about a year after Thomas, the Court was confronted with a
series of statutes, also from Arkansas, that tremendously warped the
repayment options for defaulting debtors.97 Among other things, the laws
increased the time for payment after notice of default from thirty days to
ninety, 98 reduced the late penalty from twenty percent to three percent,99
and increased the amount of time a delinquent mortgagor could remain
on the property from a minimum of sixty-five days to a minimum of six
and a half years. 100 Noting that none of the restrictions in the Minnesota
law 101 were present in this case, Justice Cardozo concluded for a
unanimous court that “[t]here has been not even an attempt to assimilate
what was done by this decree to the discretionary action of a chancellor
in subjecting an equitable remedy to an equitable condition. Not
Blaisdell’s Case, but [Thomas’s], supplies the applicable rule.” 102
Finally, in Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass’n, 103 just under four
months before deciding Ashton, the Court unanimously invalidated a
Louisiana law that removed a building association’s obligation to
94

See W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 434 (1934) (unanimous).
Id. at 433–34.
96
Id. at 434–35 (Sutherland, J., concurring).
97
See, e.g., W.B. Worthen Co. ex rel. Bd. of Comm’rs of St. Improvement Dist. No.
513 v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935) (unanimous).
98
Id. at 58–59.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 61.
101
The Minnesota statute was limited to two years, only during the scope of the
declared emergency, and creditors were still given the opportunity to be heard by a judge.
Blaisdell IV, 290 U.S. 398, 416–18 (1934).
102
Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. at 63.
103
297 U.S. 189 (1936) (unanimous).
95
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maintain a fund to pay shareholders. Treigle was not in the context of a
moratorium; instead, the legislature simply revised the law governing
building and loan associations and abrogated contracts between members
and associations that were lawful at the time into which they were
entered. 104 Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, reasoned,
[the statute] does not purport to deal with any existing
emergency and the provisions respecting the rights of
withdrawing members are neither temporary nor
conditiona . . . .Such an interference with the right of
contract cannot be justified by saying that in the public
interest the operations of building associations may be
controlled and regulated, or that in the same interest their
charters may be amended. 105
In light of these cases exploring the scope of Blaisdell prior to
Ashton, a trend seems to have emerged. Blaisdell clearly did not initially
signal “open season” on pre-existing contracts. Although the Court never
spelled out a test for what crossed the line into unconstitutional
impairment of contracts, 106 it is apparent that by the time Ashton was
decided, a state needed to show both economic emergency and that there
were substantial safeguards in place to protect creditors’ rights.107 The
argument, therefore, that states could not act themselves, was somewhat
tenuous. In his dissent in Ashton, in which he argued that municipal
bankruptcy was necessary because the states were forbidden from
impairing contracts, Justice Cardozo completely ignored the Contract
Clause jurisprudence of the previous three years. 108 There were no
Contract Clause cases decided by the Supreme Court between Ashton
and Bekins, and, in Bekins, the Court did not bother to offer a citation at
all to support its contention that the states’ hands were tied.109 Although
there is certainly a difference between a moratorium and an actual
discharge of debt, as long as a state had declared an emergency and
provided creditors with an opportunity to be heard, there would seem to
104

See id. at 195.
Id. at 195–96.
106
The Court would not actually establish a test until 1977, which I shall address infra.
See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
107
See generally Samuel R. Olken, CHARLES EVAN HUGHES AND THE BLAISDELL
DECISION: A HISTORICAL STUDY OF CONTRACT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE, 72 OR. L. REV.
513 (1993).
108
See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 534
(1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (citing instead to Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122 (1819) for the proposition that states cannot impair preexisting contracts).
109
See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938).
105
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be no reason why, under contemporary Contract Clause jurisprudence,
the states would not be able to handle municipal debts sans federal
involvement.

C. State Composition Plans for Municipalities Post-Bekins
In fact, states could—and did—implement their own municipal
composition plans outside the federal bankruptcy scheme. In 1931, New
Jersey adopted the Municipal Finance Act that authorized state control
over insolvent municipalities. 110 Like other such acts in the 1930s, New
Jersey passed the statute “to meet the public emergency arising from a
default in the payment of municipal obligations and the resulting
impairment of public credit . . . in such a way as to cause the least
embarrassment to property owners as taxpayers.”111 This adjustment of
debt could be made binding on all creditors, whether or not they
consented, 112 though the law did nominally provide for the protection
against the impairment of contracts.113 In the meantime, the erosion of
the Contract Clause had continued after the Constitutional Revolution of
1937, to the point where it was not clear it would still be enforced at
all. 114
During the height of the Great Depression, years of “optimistic and
extravagant” municipal expansion had brought the seashore resort town
of Asbury Park, New Jersey to its knees. 115 In short, the city had
expanded and when the tax base crumbled and property values
plummeted, the city was left holding municipal bonds it could no longer
afford to service. 116 Eventually, the creditors applied to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey to have the Municipal Finance Commission put in
charge of the city’s finances. 117 Citing Bekins’ assurances that the federal
110

See Act of Apr. 28, 1931, ch. 340, 1931 N.J. Laws 830 (supplemented by Act of
June 27, 1933, ch. 331, 1933 N.J. Laws 866).
111
§ 405, 1931 N.J. Laws at 835.
112
See Act of June 27, 1933, ch. 331, 1933 N.J. Laws 866, ¶ 3.
113
§ 406, 1931 N.J. Laws at 835 (“[N]othing contained in this act shall be construed to
impair in any way the obligations of any contract, or the existing remedies of any creditor
of any municipality.”).
114
See Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 39 (1940) (“We are here
considering a permanent piece of legislation. So far as the contract clause is concerned, is
this significant? We think not . . . .If the legislature could enact the legislation as to
withdrawals to protect the associations in that emergency, we see no reason why the new
status should not continue.”); see also Gelfert v. Nat’l City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 235
(1941) (“The fact that an emergency was not declared to exist when this statute was
passed does not bring within the protective scope of the contract clause rights which were
denied such protection in Honeyman v. Jacobs.”) (citation omitted).
115
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 503 (1942).
116
Id. at 503–07.
117
Id. at 503.
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municipal bankruptcy statute was narrowly and painstakingly tailored so
as not to impinge on the sovereignty of the states, the Court concluded
that it was impossible that the power to enact a federal municipal
bankruptcy statute, which specifically reserved state sovereignty, and
which had not been recognized until 1938, had preempted the states’
rights to manage their finances outside of bankruptcy. 118 The Court
thereby rejected a sort of “dormant bankruptcy clause,” where only
federal debt relief schemes would be permitted.119 Rather, the Court
found that, “[t]he intervention of the state in the fiscal affairs of its cities
is plainly an exercise of its essential reserve power to protect the vital
interests of its people by sustaining the public credit and maintaining
local government.” 120
As for the Contract Clause, the Court continued digging its grave.
First, the Court seemed to suggest that, because the municipal bonds in
question were practically worthless anyway, New Jersey was not actually
impairing anything. 121 In upholding the New Jersey statutes, Justice
Frankfurter continued:
From time to time, ever since Sturges v. Crowninshield,
it has been stated that a state insolvency act is limited by
the Contract Clause of the Constitution in authorizing
composition of preexisting debts. So it is, but it all
depends on what is affected by such a composition and
what state power it brings into play. The dictum from
Sturges v. Crowninshield is one of those inaccurate
generalizations that has gained momentum from
uncritical repetition. 122
Thus, because the bonds were practically worthless, and because
mandamus was simply an “empty right to litigate,”123 the Court
determined that, far from impairing the obligations of contracts, the
Municipal Finance Act was actually beneficial to creditors, and that the
118

See id. at 508–09.
See Lipson, supra note 7, at 631 (arguing that the Bankruptcy Clause may have been
meant more to deter a race to the bottom between states, and that the Framers may have
actually intended state law bankruptcies to be the norm, judgments under which would be
protected by the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
120
Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 512.
121
See id. at 513 (“[I]n view of the slump of the credit of the City of Asbury Park
before the adoption of the plan now assailed, appellants’ bonds had little value; the new
bonds issued under the plan, however, are not in default and there is a very substantial
market for them.”).
122
Id. (citations omitted).
123
Id. at 510.
119
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bondholders were foolish to insist upon standing on mere “paper
rights.” 124 In short, the Municipal Finance Act accomplished one of the
primary goals of bankruptcy—protecting the rights of both the debtor
and the creditors. 125
Faitoute was ostensibly limited to its facts.126 However, from a
constitutional standpoint, it appears to still be good law.127 From a
statutory standpoint, in 1946, Congress stepped in to limit Faitoute’s
applicability when it amended section 403(i) of the Bankruptcy Act to
provide that no state law composition mechanism could be binding on
any creditor who did not consent. 128 This remains, in slightly different
language, the law today. 129 In any case, it was suggested not long after
Faitoute that the Contract Clause no longer served a purpose, as the
analysis of whether or not the deprivation of a property right is
“reasonable” essentially mirrors the analysis for any other property right
under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, and would likely turn out the
same way under a Due Process challenge. 130

D. “Necessity” and the Contract Clause Today
After Faitoute, Contract Clause jurisprudence remained virtually
dormant for over twenty years. 131 In 1965, the Supreme Court in City of
El Paso v. Simmons reaffirmed the malleability of the Contract Clause
with a Texas law regarding the sale of public lands. 132 The modern
approach for Contract Clause interpretation, however, was laid out in
1977 in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey.133 In United States Trust,
New York and New Jersey financed improvements to the Port Authority
with public bonds on the condition that they not use the money to
subsidize rail transit. 134 New York and New Jersey, crunched by the
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Id. at 516.
See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 785–789 (1987).
126
See Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 516.
127
See McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 479–80.
128
Act of July 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-481, 60 Stat. 409.
129
See 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (“[A] state law prescribing a method of composition of
indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such
composition . . . .”).
130
See Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III, 57 HARV. L.
REV. 852, 890–91 (1944).
131
See FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 169–70.
132
379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965) (“The decisions put it beyond question that the prohibition
[against the impairment of contracts] is not an absolute one and is not to be read with
literal exactness like a mathematical formula.”) (quotations omitted).
133
431 U.S. 1 (1977).
134
Id. at 10–11.
125
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energy crisis of the 1970s, then repealed the promise in their respective
legislatures and subsidized rail transit anyway. 135
The Court, for the first time, applied an actual test to determine
whether a Contract Clause violation had occurred.136 The test has four
parts: 1) whether a contract with the state exists; 137 2) whether that
contract is substantially impaired; 138 3) whether that impairment serves a
significant and legitimate public purpose; 139 and 4) whether that
impairment was reasonable and necessary to satisfy that public
purpose. 140 The conservative Court of the 1970s 141 actually struck down
the legislation in question, on the grounds that concerns of environmental
protection and energy conservation were known at the time the bonds
were issued, and so the repeal failed under the fourth prong. 142 The next
year, a divided Court “dust[ed] off the Contract Clause”143 again in
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, where the Court once again
struck down a state law under the Contract Clause, in which a Minnesota
company that closed within the state would be fined to the extent that
workers who had been employed for at least ten years did not receive a
full pension. 144 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the majority, reminded
the world that “[t]he Contract Clause remains part of the Constitution. It
is not a dead letter.” 145 In a scathing dissent, Justice Brennan once again
argued that the majority was rewriting a half-century worth of Contract
Clause jurisprudence. 146 He argued that imposing additional obligations
on parties—as the Minnesota statute did—was not the same thing as
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Id. at 13–14.
See generally Debra Brubaker Burns, Note, Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Pay:
States, Their Public-Pension Bills, and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 253,
261–69 (2011) (discussing in more depth the ins and outs of United States Trust and the
test applied therein).
137
U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 17–18 (“The trial court found, and appellees do not deny,
that the 1962 covenant constituted a contract between the two States and the holders of
the Consolidated Bonds issued between 1962 and the 1972 prospective repeal.”).
138
Id. at 21 (“[A] finding that there has been a technical impairment is merely a
preliminary step in resolving the more difficult question whether that impairment is
permitted under the Constitution.”).
139
Id. at 22 (“[L]aws intended to regulate existing relationships must serve a legitimate
public purpose.”).
140
Id. at 25 (“[A]n impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose.”).
141
See FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 170–71.
142
See U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 32.
143
Id. at 44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144
438 U.S. 234, 238, 251 (1978) (5–3 decision).
145
Id. at 241.
146
See id. at 251 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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diminishing or nullifying obligations, and that such an imposition could
only be challenged as a taking under the Due Process clause. 147
Despite the momentary blip in the 1970s, however, the Court has
since consistently upheld legislation against Contract Clause challenges,
exhibiting a high level of deference to the legislature’s reasonableness
determination.148 The Supreme Court has not taken a Contract Clause
case since 1987. 149 As far as anyone can tell, then, Blaisdell is still good
law, and the Contract Clause is, even today, virtually read out of the
Constitution. 150 Accordingly, were the first federal municipal bankruptcy
statute to be enacted today, neither Congress nor the Court could credibly
argue that municipal bankruptcy was in any way necessary due to the
strictures of the Contract Clause. Useful, perhaps, due to the expertise of
the bankruptcy courts in handling complex restructuring matters, but not
“necessary.” This is especially true as the United States continues to
recover from an economic downturn that has been consistently compared
to the Great Depression. 151 For more than eighty years, even a narrow
reading of the case law permits states to impair contracts in an
emergency, so long as they take mitigating steps to protect the rights of
the creditors whose contracts are being impaired. A broader rule, as in
the more recent cases, gives the states even more power.

PART IV. THE TENTH AMENDMENT
In Bekins, the Court devoted very little time to the actual Tenth
Amendment concerns, preferring to focus on the policy reasons for
needing a federal municipal bankruptcy law.152 Those policy reasons, as I
have just addressed, were largely unfounded. 153 However, even though
the policy reasons were unfounded, it does not change the fact there is
still a municipal bankruptcy statute in effect today, and the statute is still
147

See id.; cf. Hale, supra note 130, at 890–91.
See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983)
(unanimous) (holding that an energy pricing scheme that conflicted with existing
contracts did not substantially impair the arrangement); see also Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (upholding a law pursuant to state
police power that required mining companies to leave a certain amount of coal in the
ground for structural support that was more than the amount the companies had
contracted for with the landowners).
149
See FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 174.
150
See id.
151
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Great Recession Versus the Great Depression, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2009, 4:35 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/thegreat-recession-versus-the-great-depression/.
152
See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 47–54 (1938).
153
See supra Part III.
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subject to Tenth Amendment challenges.154 In this section, I will dismiss
the notion that Chapter 9 is unconstitutional, as least as of today. 155
The modern scope of the Tenth Amendment has been largely set
forth 156 in two Supreme Court cases, New York v. United States 157 and
Printz v. United States. 158 Both of them suggest a definition of coercion
that is fundamentally incompatible with the nature of a voluntary Chapter
9 filing. 159 In short, Congress may not “commandeer the legislative
processes of the states” to force them to enact a federal program, 160 but
as I shall discuss, Chapter 9 falls outside of that coercive framework.
The key provision in question in New York was the “Take Title”
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985. 161 States that were unable to properly dispose of their low-level
nuclear waste under the federal regulatory scheme would be required to
take title to the waste and incur liability for any damages that occurred as
a result. 162 Finding that the Take Title provision did not involve Congress
threatening its use or disuse of its enumerated spending or commerce
powers, but rather submitted the states to another federal instruction if
the states did not comply, the Court struck down that provision of the
Act. 163 Honing in on the coercive nature of the provision, Justice
O’Connor wrote, “A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive
regulatory techniques is no choice at all.” 164
154

See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 141–49 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
The Tenth Amendment was extremely underdeveloped in the case law at the time
Bekins was decided. Indeed, Ashton largely rested on its violation. See United States v.
Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (“The amendment states but a truism that
all is retained which has not been surrendered.”); see also Ashton v. Cameron Cnty.
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 530–32 (1936) (finding that the 1934 Act
violated the Tenth Amendment).
156
See Burns, supra note 136, at 281.
157
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
158
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
159
This paper only deals with voluntary petitions, for two reasons. First, under the
Bankruptcy Code, involuntary petitions against state entities are not permitted. Second,
even if they were, such a filing would unquestionably violate the Eleventh Amendment,
and very likely the Tenth as well.
160
New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288); see also In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 149 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 2013) (describing the holding of New York succinctly as, “[A] state cannot
consent to be compelled.”).
161
See New York, 505 U.S. at 151–53.
162
See id. at 153–54.
163
See id. at 176.
164
Id.; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012)
(holding that Congress could not penalize states that chose not to comply with new
Medicaid requirements under the Affordable Care Act by taking away their existing
Medicaid funding).
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Several years later, as a result of Congress passing the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act, state chief law enforcement officers
(CLEOs) were required to enforce certain background check provisions
of the federal regulatory scheme. 165 Even though the enforcement
provisions were only temporary, private firearms dealers were still
required to forward background check forms to the CLEOs, who then
needed to process them. 166 Once again, the Court struck down the Act as
being coercive: “The Federal Government may neither issue directives
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program.” 167 In concurrence, Justice
O’Connor, the author of New York, noted that Congress was free to
amend the statute such that the states contracted with the federal
government to enforce the regulation, à la federal highway funds in
return for a drinking age of twenty-one. 168
The most recent case in which a federal law was struck down for
being coercive was the first “Obamacare” decision.169 In Sebelius, the
Court held that Congress was not permitted to withhold all Medicaid
funding to a state that refused to participate in the new Medicaid scheme
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), noting
that “Congress may not simply conscript states agencies into the national
bureaucratic army.” 170 Once again, however, the Court explicitly refused
to “fix the outermost line” between congressional persuasion and
coercion. 171
During oral argument of another case involving the ACA, King v.
Burwell, the Court suggested that it might be revisiting the issue of
coercion again. 172 Specifically, the question was whether the way the
petitioners were interpreting the ACA—that only healthcare exchanges
established by states, as opposed to those established by the federal
government, entitled their users to tax subsidies—demonstrated an
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unconstitutional invasion of state sovereignty by Congress. 173 In short,
threatening the states with the options of setting up their own healthcare
exchanges or suffering insurance “death spirals” may have been an
unconstitutionally coercive choice. However, the issue of coercion went
unmentioned in both the majority and minority opinions.174 The Court
likewise denied an opportunity to review a decision out of the Third
Circuit that held that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
of 1992 (“PASPA”) did not violate the anti-commandeering principal
underlying the Tenth Amendment. 175 Thus, it seems that, for the time
being, our understanding of coercion is still constrained by New York,
Printz, and Sebelius.
Irrespective of where the Supreme Court winds up on the issue of
coercion, what should be immediately apparent between the provisions in
New York, Printz, Sebelius, and Chapter 9 is that Chapter 9 is both
implicitly and explicitly non-coercive. To begin with, only voluntary
petitions are permitted, and no creditor or group of creditors can submit a
state or its subdivisions to the power of a federal court. 176 Filing a
voluntary petition is by definition a voluntary act. This is even more so
the case where states have options outside the bankruptcy context, due to
the frailty of the Contract Clause. 177 Rather than a regulatory scheme that
the state is forced into,178 Chapter 9 is simply another avenue for state
subdivisions to adjust their debts. Furthermore, as an additional
protection against federal intrusion into state financial affairs, the
Bankruptcy Code explicitly provides that “[t]his chapter does not limit or
impair the power of a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a
municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the political or
governmental powers of such municipality, including expenditures for
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such exercise,” 179 and that unless the debtor consents, the court may not
interfere with political powers of the debtor, property or revenues of the
debtor, or the debtor’s use of any income-producing property. 180 And
although there may be some concern about the sovereignty of a
municipality post-petition and post-waiver, that is beyond the scope of
this paper. On its face, Chapter 9 complies with the Tenth Amendment.
Congress, having been granted the power to write a uniform law on
the subject of bankruptcies, is clearly within its right to enact a municipal
bankruptcy statute, as long as it does so within the confines of its
otherwise enumerated powers. 181 The strictures of Chapter 9 plainly
contemplate a Tenth Amendment challenge and are sufficient to rebut the
same. Note that, under this understanding, it would not appear to make a
difference constitutionally whether Congress required general
authorization or specific authorization from the state under section 109 in
order to file.182 As long as the state consents in some way to the filing—
that is, it is not coerced by an ultra vires act of Congress—a Tenth
Amendment challenge will fall flat. The ultimate conclusion in Bekins
was therefore correct; 183 the Court simply needlessly focused on the
supposed necessity of a municipal bankruptcy act and failed to pay
adequate attention to the “real” issue of state sovereignty.

PART V. CONCLUSION
Although Chapter 9 had a rocky beginning in the Courts, there
remains a relative dearth of case law, owing to the few number of cases
filed and even fewer of number of actual cities filing. 184 The unfortunate
result of this, at least for the time being, is that in large Chapter 9 cases in
which billions of dollars are at stake, such as Detroit, the
constitutionality of Chapter 9 will continue to be litigated. The irony is
that, if states acted on their own, pursuant to contracted Contract Clause,
the state would probably still have to litigate. Thus, in some ways, it does
179
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not matter under which method a state proceeds—if the money is big
enough, there are going to be objections from creditors. It is my hope,
therefore, that this paper has adequately addressed both of these issues,
making their resolution easier when they inevitably arise.
States have wide discretion to “impair” contracts, as long as they
provide safeguards for the creditors who are taking a haircut. Bekins, still
controlling law in the municipal bankruptcy context, was therefore
correctly decided, but for the wrong reason. Likewise, the protections
built into Chapter 9 allow Chapter 9 to survive any Tenth Amendment
challenges. The modern Tenth Amendment is concerned with coercion,
and, with the state either consenting or remaining in complete control
every step of the way, it is difficult to compare Chapter 9 to either
provision struck down in New York or Printz, or the withdrawal of
Medicaid funding in Sebelius. Chapter 9 is here, and it’s here to stay.

